

## CHAPTER 7

### NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGIES: 1990 TO 2009

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The six Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff since 1990—Generals Colin Powell (1989-93), John Shalikashvili (1993-97), Hugh Shelton (1997-2001), Richard Myers (2001-05), Peter Pace (2005-07), and Admiral Michael Mullen (2007-current)—used an unclassified national military strategy to provide strategic direction to the Armed Forces from guidance in the President and Secretary of Defense’s strategic documents and communicated that direction to Congress and the American people. The Chairman’s responsibilities as the nation’s senior military advisor to provide this strategic direction, along with many other planning, preparedness, and requirements responsibilities, are specified in Title 10 U.S. Code. These increased responsibilities were a result of the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act (GNA), considered to be the most significant piece of defense legislation since the National Security Defense Act of 1947 that established the Department of Defense (DoD).<sup>1</sup> The GNA was the result of almost 4 years of somewhat contentious dialogue and debate among Congress, military leaders, the defense intellectual community, and the Reagan administration.<sup>2</sup> Congress intended in passing this act to better organize the DoD to strengthen civilian authority, improve military advice to civilian leaders, provide for more efficient use of resources, develop better strategy and plans, and improve mission execution by combatant commanders.<sup>3</sup>

While this chapter will discuss the strategic environment each Chairman faced in more detail as it examines each of the four national military strategies, the first three Chairmen were challenged by an environment that began with the Gulf War and continued with an increasing number of regional military operations across the spectrum of conflict as the decade progressed. They had to meet these challenges while accommodating slowing declining financial resources and a Cold War-equipped force reduced by about one-third. Since 2000, and particularly after September 2001, the last three Chairmen faced different security challenges dominated by the focus on terrorism, most evidenced by wars in Afghanistan and in Iraq, while needing to transform in stride by developing future capabilities to achieve the vision of full spectrum dominance. They had to meet these challenges with greater financial resources, better technology, more reliance on activating reserve forces, and a slow growth in Army and Marine Corps force structure as the decade ended.<sup>4</sup> These challenges were fundamentally very different during this 2-decade period and are summarized in Figure 1. The four national military strategies were the key formal way each Chairman advised the nation’s civilian and military leaders on how best to meet these challenges.

This chapter will focus on the Chairmen’s leadership challenges and how they developed and used four different national military strategies in 1992, 1995, 1997, and 2004 to respond to those challenges. This article describes in broad terms the strategic environment facing each Chairman, as it formed the basis for his subsequent military strategy. Then each of the strategies’ key components, which were organized around an *ends, ways* and *means* construct, will be examined. The formal direction provided by these strategies was an important aspect of each Chairman’s leadership legacy. Since each military strategy was part of and perhaps the key integrating component of an overall strategic planning system used by the Chairman to help execute his many formal responsibilities, this chapter begins by briefly examining from a military strategy perspective this planning system’s overall evolution and integrating nature.

1990s Regional competition and threats Gulf War Diverse military operations Declining financial resources Reduced personnel by one-third Need to integrate technology Robust overseas bases and deployed forces Well maintained Cold War equipment	2000s Global War on Terrorism Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan Increased operations tempo Increasing financial resources Greater Reserve use & small personnel increase Need to transform to capabilities Less global infrastructure Sustain, update & develop new equipment
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**Figure 1. Chairmen’s Strategic Environment Challenges.**

## JOINT STRATEGIC PLANNING SYSTEM

The Chairman’s strategic planning system integrates the processes and documents of the people and organizations above him – the President, Secretary of Defense, and National and Homeland Security Councils (until the elimination of the HSC by the Obama administration) and the people and organizations with which he directly coordinates (Services, agencies, and combatant commanders). The Chairman has no control over any significant defense resources (Secretary of Defense, Services, and agencies control resources) or direct control of operational military forces (combatant commanders control operational forces); however, orders to those forces flow through the Chairman. The Chairman formally influences his civilian leaders, and those with whom he coordinates, through the processes and documents developed from this strategic planning system. In addition to influencing leaders, this planning system provides insights and specific direction for the many staffs that support these leaders. As such, the Chairman’s Joint Strategic Planning System formally evolved five times during this 19-year period in 1990, 1993, 1997, 1999, and 2008. It is the key planning system that integrates the nation’s strategy, plans, and resources from a joint military perspective that consist by FY 2010 of approximately 2.3 million active, guard, and reserve forces and total defense outlays of \$664B.<sup>5</sup>

### 1989 Status.

Prior to 1990 there were 10 rather large and primarily classified strategic planning products that were described as voluminous, somewhat stove-piped, and highly bureaucratic, but this was indicative of strategic planning products produced in the late 1980s.<sup>6</sup> The Senate Armed Services Committee called this style of strategic planning ineffective, and the former Chief of Naval Operations, in remarking on a strategic planning document, stated it was “. . . almost as valueless to read as it was fatiguing to write . . . a synthesis of mutually contradictory positions that the guidance they gave was minimal.”<sup>7</sup> Chairman Powell recognized these deficiencies and greatly streamlined the system when he published Memorandum of Policy No. 7 on January 30, 1990.<sup>8</sup>

### 1990 Change.

The 1990 change added a front-end leader's guidance while eliminating or combining many other documents, as 10 planning products were reduced to four. The front-end guidance was designed to be documented through a formal joint strategy review for ". . . gathering information, raising issues, and facilitating the integration of strategy, operational planning, and program assessments," that culminated with publishing *Chairman's Guidance*.<sup>9</sup> This concise document (6 to 10 pages) was structured to provide the principal initial direction to develop the planning system's next three documents: the *National Military Strategy Document*, *Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan* (JSCP), and the *Chairman's Program Assessment*. The classified *National Military Strategy Document* (NMSD) was to be developed under a rigid 2-year cycle with several parts, one of which was a *National Military Strategy*. In addition, there were seven functional annexes added to this document, such as intelligence and research and development that in total comprised hundreds of more pages. The part of the NSMD called the *National Military Strategy* (also classified) would be sent to the Secretary of Defense for review and forwarded to the President for approval before returning to influence defense resource guidance.

### 1993 Change.

Chairman Powell again revised this planning system in March 1993 by publishing the first change to his earlier Memorandum of Policy No. 7.<sup>10</sup> This change essentially codified what was executed in previous years rather than designing a new system as had been done in 1990. This revised system included the following guidance: place more focus on long-range planning by requiring formal environmental scanning to determine what challenges the strategy needed to consider; issue the *National Military Strategy* as an unclassified document to communicate with the American people rather than just providing internal military direction; establish a *Joint Planning Document* to sharpen the Chairman's advice to the Secretary of Defense on how to resource the strategy; and keep the JSCP, which directs plans to implement that strategy in the field, the same.

### 1997 Change.

Chairman Shalikashvili made the next revision to the strategic planning system in September 1997 when he published Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3100.01.<sup>11</sup> This instruction again reflected changes he instituted in prior years rather than formally changing the system before execution. He kept the national military strategy as an unclassified document produced in a flexible manner that looked out about 5 years, but he added the 1996 *Joint Vision 2010* to provide longer range direction not covered by his strategy. He also added the *Chairman's Program Recommendation*, the second Chairman's resource document, to provide leader-focused resource advice to better implement both the strategy and vision. Again, the JSCP's focus was left unchanged.

### 1999 Change.

Chairman Shelton made the final formal change to the strategic planning system during this decade in September 1999.<sup>12</sup> He did not change any major processes or products. Instead, he placed more focus on Theater Engagement Plans to broadly integrate the strategy's shape component and on implementing the 1996 *Joint Vision* to better support the strategy's prepare component. The vision implementation process involved identifying specific 21st century security challenges and the desired operational capabilities to meet those challenges, all of which provided joint direction to conduct operational experiments and influence resource decisions.<sup>13</sup> Overall, this decade's strategic planning system changes resulted in improvements to better execute the national military

strategy. These four changes in the strategic planning system from 1989 to 1999 are portrayed in Figure 2.<sup>14</sup>




Figure 2: Evolution of Strategic Planning System, 1989 to 1999

**2000-08 Time Period.**

During Chairman Myers' tenure as Chairman from 2001-05, no official changes were made to the 1999 operating instruction that describes the strategic planning system, although the formal system was not followed exactly since the early 2000s. In execution, General Myers published three new strategy-related documents, kept four existing planning products to include the unclassified national military strategy, and no longer produced the separate vision and staff-resource advice products. The three new strategy-related products he added in coordination with the Secretary of Defense were: a classified 2002 *National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism* to provide more guidance to the military's effort to execute the nation's strategies associated with terrorism; a classified *Chairman's Risk Assessment* that identified to Congress the strategic and military risk to execute the national military strategy; and *Joint Operating Concepts* in 2003 that was revised to the *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations* in 2005.<sup>15</sup> These last two documents focused on future concepts and capabilities associated with implementing the vision of full spectrum dominance, now included in the military strategy's last section.

During General Pace's tenure as Chairman from 2005 to 2007, no formal changes were made to the joint strategic planning system although coordination of a draft instruction was initiated to

formally integrate the many changes made in execution.<sup>16</sup> From a strategy perspective, General Pace did not change the 2004 *National Military Strategy* inherited from his predecessor although a biannual review and risk assessment were conducted as specified in the U.S. Code. However, he published three military strategies on specific subjects that were subordinate to the 2004 *National Military Strategy*. These strategies, the subject readily determined by their titles, were as follows: *National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism*, *National Military Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction* and the *National Military Strategy for Cyberspace Operations*.

## 2008 Change.

In December 2008 a major update was made to the strategic planning system to integrate complex processes and products to provide more holistic assessments and unified strategic direction while reducing the number of formal products. This change, published as a 65-page Chairman’s instruction, in many respects is analogous to the 1990 change described earlier for its comprehensive and more focused nature. This new planning system is organized around three key Chairman’s roles of assess, advise, and direct with formal components as follows: Assess – *Comprehensive Joint Assessment* and *Joint Strategic Review* process; Advise – *Chairman’s Risk Assessment*, *Chairman’s Program Recommendation*, *Chairman’s Program Assessment*, *Joint Strategy Review Report*, and Chairman’s advice in strategic documents; and Direct – *National Military Strategy* and *Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan*.<sup>17</sup> Figure 3 is a way to envision this change and the Chairman’s roles.<sup>18</sup>




Figure 3: Strategic Planning System 2008

The “assess” aspect of the new system is a comprehensive change with two key components that integrate both deliberate and continuous assessments to provide a common strategic perspective of the environment. The first component is the *Comprehensive Joint Assessment* (CJA) that consists of a shared database and primarily qualitative assessments from other continuous and deliberate environmental scanning and mission analysis conducted by Services, Defense Agencies, Joint Staff, and combatant commanders across missions, domains, functions, and time. The

*Joint Strategy Review (JSR)* process is the second main assess component that synthesizes data and insights gained from the CJA into staff evaluations that enrich or refine existing Chairman’s products. Overall, this access process will then influence the next military strategy as well as the annual risk assessment of the existing strategy.

The “advise” aspect is reflected in four main documents and numerous opportunities the Chairman has to provide input to many other strategic documents to execute his advice responsibilities, which are related in some way to the *National Military Strategy*. The *Chairman’s Risk Assessment (CRA)*, specified by Congress as a result of the 2004 National Defense Authorization Act, is his assessment, routed through the Secretary of Defense, of the nature and magnitude of risk to execute the missions in the current *National Military Strategy*.<sup>19</sup> The *Chairman’s Program Recommendation (CPR)* is his personal advice in early spring to the Secretary of Defense before the Secretary provides final resource guidance to the Services and Defense Agencies. The *Chairman’s Program Assessment (CPA)* is his personal advice in early fall to the Secretary of Defense of the Services and certain Defense Agencies’ Program Objective Memorandum to influence the Pentagon’s program and budget review decisions. Both of these leader resource-focused documents will reflect in some way on military strategy’s means. The *Joint Strategy Review Report*, focused on the strategic and military implications of the security environment and completed in odd numbered years or as required, will broadly influence the next military strategy’s ends and ways and in a lesser manner its means.<sup>20</sup>

The “direct” aspect remains relatively unchanged with developing and publishing the *National Military Strategy (NMS)* and the *Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP)*. The JSCP provides detailed guidance to enable combatant commanders, Service Chiefs, Defense agencies, and select others to develop the wide variety of plans to accomplish tasks and missions or the strategy’s broad “ways. It implements campaign, campaign support, contingency, and other planning in the Defense Secretary’s Guidance for Employment of the Force.<sup>21</sup> The *National Military Strategy* gets inputs from many sources, is organized around a military ends (now called objectives in the current instruction), ways, and means framework, directs the Joint Force, and informs many others. A way to envision this overall strategic direction is illustrated in Figure 4.<sup>22</sup>



**Figure 4: National Military Strategy**

All of these Chairmen's changes incrementally resulted in the strategic planning system evolving from being rigid and Cold War focused in 1990 to being more flexible, vision oriented, and resource focused at the decade's end. After 2000, the strategic planning system, although changes were not documented until 2008, in execution was more focused on the many diverse facets associated with the War on Terrorism through its multiple strategy documents and identifying joint force capabilities and concepts. Throughout this 19-year period with its changing national security challenges, the unclassified *National Military Strategy* remains the Chairman's strategic planning system keystone document, and its guidance will now be examined.

## **NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGIES (1989, 1992, 1995, 1999, AND 2004)**

### **1989 National Military Strategy Document.**

At the beginning of 1990, the formal manner by which the Chairman advised the President and the Secretary of Defense on the strategic direction of the Armed Forces was via a classified and rather voluminous *National Military Strategy Document* (NMSD) and a shorter classified *National Military Strategy* that was part of the NSMD. Admiral William Crowe published these in 1989 to provide guidance for the resource time frame of FY 92 to 97. The process to produce this strategy was also formally linked to the Defense Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System. Hence, this was the strategy and planning processes that General Powell inherited.<sup>23</sup>

The classified 1989 *National Military Strategy Document* included chapters dedicated to subjects such as: national military objectives, national military strategy, appraisal of U.S. defense policy, intelligence appraisal, fiscally constrained force levels, net assessment options and risk evaluation.<sup>24</sup> In addition to this basic document, there were seven separate classified annexes on functional subjects that supported the strategy in subjects such as intelligence; research and development; and command, control and communications. The size of some of these annexes exceeded the basic document itself as one annex alone had 11 chapters, 13 tables, and 15 tabs. The 1989 strategy focused on the Cold War and the Soviet Union and articulated the military element in many of the worldwide alliances, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). This strategy, which was underpinned with a robust nuclear deterrent, included a forward defense with many forces deployed forward, particularly in Europe and Korea, which were then backed up by rapid reinforcement to dispersed operating bases in many nations.<sup>25</sup>

### **1992 National Military Strategy.**

The demise of the Soviet Union, a broad retreat from ideological support of communism, and an inclusive international coalition that reversed Iraqi aggression in Kuwait characterized the strategic environment that influenced the 1992 strategy.<sup>26</sup> On the positive side, democracy was growing in many parts of the world. On the negative side, regional conflicts, animosities, and weapons proliferation that the bi-polar world and Cold War had previously constrained now had the potential to intensify. In essence this was the new world order, which was a concept articulated by the President Bush in his September 11, 1990, speech to a joint session of Congress and repeated many times later.<sup>27</sup>

The 1992 strategy, which was unclassified and only 27 pages long, was a complete change from the previous one in clarity, conciseness, and strategic direction. While this strategy was published

in January 1992, its roots can be traced to the President's *National Security Strategy*, the Secretary of Defense's policies in his *Defense Planning Guidance* and *Annual Report to the President and the Congress*, and General Powell's development of the Base Force. This strategy represented a ". . . shift from containing the spread of communism and deterring Soviet aggression to a more diverse, flexible strategy that is regionally oriented and capable of responding to the challenges of this decade."<sup>28</sup> In essence, this was the most fundamental change in the U.S. military strategy since the global containment strategy and Cold War that began in the 1950s. The military's primary objective was now focused on deterring and fighting regional wars rather than containing a super-power rival.

This strategy was based on the United States providing leadership to promote global peace and security. It was built on the following four foundations: Strategic Deterrence and Defense, which consisted of a credible nuclear deterrent composed of offensive and defensive capabilities; Forward Presence, which consisted of forces continually stationed or deployed worldwide; Crisis Response, which was the ability to respond quickly to more than one regional crisis; and Reconstitution, which involved the ability to mobilize personnel, equipment, and the industrial base to rebuild military strength. The strategy also specified eight strategic principles that reinforced those four foundations. They were: readiness, collective security, arms control, maritime and aerospace superiority, strategic agility, power projection, technological superiority, and decisive force. In concluding, the strategy described how to employ forces and specified the broad military force structure, called the "Base Force," to implement the strategy.

This Base Force, which was determined earlier, was broadly composed of strategic nuclear forces, Army divisions, Navy ships, Marine expeditionary forces, and Air Force fighter wing equivalents. When compared to the 1991 force structure, the Base Force was significantly smaller by the following representative systems or organizations: 460 missiles and 16 nuclear submarines from the strategic forces; 4 active and 2 U.S. Army Guard Divisions; 80 naval ships and 3 Carrier Battle Groups; and 7 Active and 1 Reserve Air Force Fighter Wing Equivalents.<sup>29</sup> The strategy clearly conveyed to the American people, one of the main target audiences if not the most important, why they needed a military and in what size. At this time, the American people and Congress were clamoring for a peace dividend as the end of the Cold War sank in, and the euphoria of the 1991 Operation DESERT STORM victory ended.

This strategy's coordination was different than the bureaucratic coordination of other strategic planning documents on the Joint Staff, which illustrated the flexibility in strategic planning General Powell achieved. The strategy, which had undergone a few variations and was interrupted by operational necessity (Gulf War and Soviet internal turmoil) from its conceptual beginnings in 1990 to the end of 1991, was finally published in January 1992. It did not go through a disciplined two-year cycle with its associated annexes and formal assessments as specified by the planning system's instructions, but more quickly reacted to the strategic environment and Chairman's leadership needs. A Joint Staff Officer, Harry Rothman, who was part of the process, gave credit to General Powell's personal relationships and strategic vision of the world that broke down the impediments resident in formal planning processes. He stated that ". . . people and not the process were more important in the forging of the new strategy."<sup>30</sup> General Powell spent considerable energy convincing other senior leaders and converting them to his broad views rather than conducting the detailed coordination at junior or middle levels that usually influenced joint staff planning document's content.

One other significant aspect about this strategy was the foreword to the document, which illustrated General Powell's leadership style that combined boldness and humility. The foreword boldly stated that the strategy was his advice, in consultation with other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Commanders of unified and specified commands, and that he presented it to



fulfill his responsibility under the GNA to provide such advice. Humbly and emphasizing civilian control of the military, the Foreword also stated that in determining this strategy, he listened to his civilian leadership, as the strategy clearly implemented the President's and Secretary of Defense's policies. Clearly, as the first Chairman totally under the GNA, General Powell created a leadership legacy in this strategy's style and substance, as it was the first unclassified strategy signed by a Chairman. Lorna Jaffe in her detailed examination of the Base Force's development, a key part of the strategy, concluded that Powell fully used the enhanced authority of the GNA and stated:

While he hoped to win the Services to his point of view, he did not aim for either bureaucratic consensus through staff work or corporate consensus through JCS meetings. He never asked the Service Chiefs to vote on either the Base Force or recommending to the Secretary and the President adoption of a new strategy [NMS]. Rather, he thought it was more important to win the Secretary's approval.<sup>31</sup>

### **1995 National Military Strategy.**

The strategic environment at this time was centered on an unsettled world that exhibited both opportunities and threats.<sup>32</sup> The following characterized this world: regional instability as evidenced by conflict in the Balkans, Somalia, and Rwanda; concern about the possible proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to hostile regional groups or terrorists from the Soviet Union's breakup; transnational dangers associated with fleeing refugees, diseases, and crime syndicates; and dangers to nations undergoing transition to democratic reform, particularly those in the former Soviet Union. The strategy developed to respond to these challenges was one of two produced by General Shalikashvili. These strategies looked very similar to General Powell's in style, but in direction were very different in a few key areas.

The 1995 strategy took guidance from the President's *National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement* and defined the military's two simple main objectives—promote stability and thwart aggression. While the thwart aggression was embedded in the 1992 strategy, the promote stability objective was fundamentally different than the 1992 strategy. The 1995 strategy described a more active use of the military globally to promote stability rather than to react to instances of instability. To achieve these two objectives the 1995 strategy defined three components: (1) peacetime engagement, which was the broad range of noncombat activities to promote democracy, relieve suffering and enhance overall regional stability; (2) deterrence and conflict prevention, which ranged from conflict's high end represented by nuclear deterrence to conflict's low end represented by peace enforcement to restore stability, security, and international law; and (3) fight and win, which the strategy described as the military's foremost responsibility and defined as the ability to fight and win two major regional contingencies. In essence, the military was expected to become more engaged in conflict prevention to include missions such as peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and nation assistance; missions not mentioned in the 1992 strategy.

The *National Military Strategy* also identified the military forces necessary to execute the strategy, but earlier work by the Secretary of Defense's Bottom-Up Review had actually determined the force structure outside the formal strategy development process. While the military missions were growing in noncombat areas, the force structure was decreasing from the 1992 Base Force. For example, active Army divisions declined by two, the Air Force lost six fighter wings, and Navy combatant ships went from 450 to 346.<sup>33</sup> In addition, reconstitution, described in the 1992 strategy as forming, training, and fielding new fighting units along with activating the industrial base, dropped out of the 1995 strategy altogether. Hence, maintaining readiness became ever more important as the force became smaller and was used more frequently. This readiness focus was

greatly emphasized by Chairman Shalikashvili, as he used words related to readiness in his annual Posture Statements to Congress with significantly greater frequency than Chairman Powell.<sup>34</sup>

This strategy's development was significantly different than the 1992 strategy, as it followed the more flexible processes and overall structure outlined in the 1993 instructions that changed the strategic planning system. The strategy included information summarized from another strategic planning product, the *Joint Strategy Review*, and reflected the conceptual outline as defined in the 1993 memorandum.<sup>35</sup> This illustrated that formal processes, as well as people, drove this strategy's development. This also reflected General Shalikashvili's leadership style, which could be characterized as using interpersonal skills to develop and value consensus and using strategic planning processes to help achieve and implement that consensus.<sup>36</sup> In addition, since this strategy was similar in style to the previous one, an existing strategic planning process could more easily produce an evolutionary vice revolutionary product.

### 1997 National Military Strategy.

Opportunities and threats again characterized the strategic environment in 1997.<sup>37</sup> The opportunities were the lower threshold of global war and the potential for a more peaceful world. The four principal threats this strategy identified were: (1) regional dangers as primarily represented by Iran, Iraq, and North Korea; (2) asymmetric challenges as represented by state or nonstate actors to include terrorists that might possess WMD; (3) transnational dangers such as extremism, ethnic or religious disputes, crime, and refugee flows; and (4) wild cards that could arise from unexpected world or technology events as yet undefined or by a synergistic combination of the other three threats.

To respond to these challenges, the strategy centered on concepts described by the three simple words of *shape*, *respond*, and *prepare*. These words and concepts were more broadly articulated for all elements of a nation's power in the President's May 1997 *National Security Strategy* and also used in the Secretary of Defense's May 1997 *Quadrennial Defense Review* (QDR). In integrating advice from the President and Secretary of Defense these words took the following meaning in the military strategy: "US Armed Forces advance national security by applying military power to **Shape** the international environment and **Respond** to the full spectrum of crisis, while we **Prepare Now** for an uncertain future."<sup>38</sup>

The 1997 NMS built on the work of the previous strategy, but was different in four main areas. First, it more specifically identified the asymmetric and wild card threats, which in hindsight could conceptually reflect the characteristics of the al Qaeda organization and the subsequent September 11, 2001 (9/11) attacks 4 years later. Second, it strongly made the case for why the military needed to be involved with shaping the international environment. While doing so, it clearly emphasized the warfighting aspect when it stated: "Our Armed Forces' foremost task is to fight and win our Nation's wars."<sup>39</sup> Third, it identified the force structure to execute the strategy in greater detail than previously done, which may have been a way for the Chairman to more definitively specify needed force structure. For example, the strategy now identified the required numbers of: Army Corps, cavalry regiments, and National Guard enhanced brigades; naval attack submarines and amphibious groups; and defense department civilians, Coast Guard personnel and special operations forces. Fourth, in preparing for the future, the strategy established an early foundation for the current joint force and defense transformation when it identified the characteristics for a multi-mission, joint, and interoperable force. This was clearly the greatest joint focus of any military strategy to date.

This strategy was also developed within the strategic planning process. It relied on two other 1996 strategic planning documents. The *Joint Strategy Review* influenced the strategy's strategic

environment assessment, and the section that covered preparing for the future leveraged the concepts identified in the 1996 *Joint Vision 2010*. Since the strategy came out in September, a short time after the President's May *National Security Strategy* and the Secretary of Defense's first QDR, it illustrated the interconnectivity and strong collaboration that existed among the military and civilian leadership in the National Security Council, Secretary of Defense, and Joint Chiefs of Staff. While General Shalikashvili signed this strategy in his last month as Chairman, it was fully coordinated with General Shelton, the announced incoming Chairman.<sup>40</sup>

## 2004 National Military Strategy.

Prior to the publication of the National Military Strategy in 2004, the nation experienced a dramatic change in the strategic environment that started with the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 and included the strategic response of *Operation Enduring Freedom* (Afghanistan) in October 2001 and *Operation Iraqi Freedom* (Iraq) in March 2003. In essence the military was fully engaged in the War on Terrorism in these two countries as well as in others. A defense strategy being written in concert with this military strategy placed the persistent and emerging security challenges the United States faced into four categories of traditional, irregular, catastrophic, and disruptive.<sup>41</sup> A traditional challenge was more associated with states employing well-formed militaries and systems that typified the massive state-on-state warfare characteristic of World War II. Irregular challenges reflected unconventional methods used by both state and nonstate entities against a stronger state, or somewhat akin to what occurred during parts of the Vietnam War. Catastrophic challenges focused on terrorist or rogue use of WMD or methods producing WMD-like effects, which reflected concerns identified in the 1997 strategy. The last category was disruptive, which described competitors making a breakthrough by technological means to overcome the U.S. advantage in a particular operational domain. This last category reflected aspects of the 21st century environment that previous strategies had not articulated.

This military strategy amplified these four broad defense challenges when it specified three key aspects of the environment that had unique military implications. These three aspects were under the headings: a wider range of adversaries; a more complex and distributed battlespace; and technology diffusion and access. The wider range of adversaries aspect ran the gamut from established or rogue states to nonstate organizations, such as crime syndicates or terrorists networks and finally to individuals. The complex battlespace aspect included: the entire globe, whether in urban or desolated areas; defined physical space or cyber space; or in foreign states or the U.S. homeland. Emphasis on the U.S. homeland was unique to this strategy. The technology diffusion aspect reflected the global availability and easy access to civilian dual-use technologies that determined adversaries could adapt for military use. The last aspect was again very different than seen in previous military strategies.

To meet these challenges the military strategy again built directly on defense objectives, as it defined three key supporting military objectives. These three military objectives were organized around three simple words of: *protect*, *prevent* and *prevail*. They were simply defined as: "protect the United States against external attacks and aggression; prevent conflict and surprise attack; and prevail against adversaries."<sup>42</sup>

To achieve these objectives, this strategy made no reference to specific force structure as had previous military strategies. Instead, it emphasized the desired attributes, functions, and capabilities for a joint force. However, it also supported what came to be called a 1-4-2-1 force sizing construct that appeared in the defense strategy. The 1-4-2-1 construct postulated that the U.S. military needed to accomplish the following: defend the homeland (1), deter forward in and from four regions (4); conduct two overlapping defeat campaigns (2); and win decisively in one campaign

(1).<sup>43</sup> Overall, this force structure approach provided greater flexibility for future force structure changes in concert with a capability vice threat-based approach, and it clearly had the greatest joint focus to date of any military strategy.

The process to produce this strategy was very different from the other three strategies in many ways. A draft of the strategy was produced in 2002 to integrate the advice of the post 9/11 2001 QDR and the 2002 *National Security Strategy*. However there was some question whether an unclassified *National Military Strategy* was needed. For example, a defense strategy was published as part of the QDR, the Chairman provided military specific advice by the 2002 classified *National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism*, and he provided unclassified operational military advice in 2003 through the *Joint Operations Concepts*. However, Congress cleared up any ambiguity that existed when it passed the 2004 National Defense Authorization Act. This Act required the Chairman to produce a detailed report that is a biennial review of the *National Military Strategy* in eight specific areas to include the strategic and military risks inherent in executing the strategy.<sup>44</sup> This amendment to existing U.S. Code involving the Chairman's responsibilities is an example of Congress performing its oversight role. If Congress is not satisfied with the information it receives, it will pass legislation that is then more specific on "what" the Chairman needs to provide.

The actual writing of the 2004 military strategy followed a very integrated and parallel path as the Vice Director of Strategy, Plans and Policy on the Joint Staff stated: "So we've worked hand in glove with the Secretary of Defense's staff in developing both of these documents."<sup>45</sup> The Defense Staff focused on writing a national defense strategy, the first time this was done as a separate unclassified document, and the Joint Staff focused on writing a national military strategy. As such, one sees the military strategy directly referencing a national defense strategy in many of its sections, which reflects this close collaboration to ensure synchronization and alignment. While the military strategy was completed in 2004 and copies could be located on the internet, it was officially released at a March 18, 2005, press conference when the Under Secretary Defense for Policy and Joint Staff Vice Director of Strategy, Plans and Policy discussed the 2005 *National Defense Strategy* and 2004 *National Military Strategy* together.<sup>46</sup>

## CONCLUSION

The *National Military Strategy* is the keystone document of an overarching strategic planning system that enabled the Chairman as the nation's senior military advisor to execute his formal leadership responsibilities specified by Congress in Title 10 U.S. Code. Since 1990, each of these four strategies identified the military's ends, ways, and means that were needed to meet the nation's security challenges broadly identified by the President in his *National Security Strategy* and implemented guidance by the Secretary of Defense from other strategic documents, which now includes a *National Defense Strategy*. The unclassified nature of the military strategy and its completion by the Chairman to integrate this civilian advice, provide strategic direction to the Armed Forces and communicate to external audiences was a leadership legacy started by Chairman Powell that continues today. Most importantly, this strategy directly communicates to the American people the need for a military, what that military will do, and how it will do it to provide for our nation's security. It essentially creates a compact between the military and the American people that is so important in today's complex and interconnected global security environment.

## ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 7

1. Robert H. Cole *et al.*, *The Chairmanship of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*, Washington DC: Joint History Office, 1995, p. 30.
2. Richard M. Meinhart, *Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff's Leadership using the Joint Strategic Planning System in the 1990s: Recommendations for Strategic Leaders*, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2003, pp. 2-7.
3. U.S. Congress House of Representatives, *Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, Conference Report (99-824)*, 99th Cong., 2nd Sess., September 12, 1986, Section 3.
4. Challenge discussion is author's assessment from reading national military strategies and attending lectures when teaching at the Army War College. Reserve forces have changed from a strategic reserve to an operational reserve with increased use. There were slight increases in active duty ground forces starting in 2005 to 2010 time frame as end strength ceilings of Army and Marine Corps were increased by about 65,000 and 29,000 while Navy and Air Force were reduced by 29,000 and 24,000. Data on force structure comes from *The Army Budget, Fiscal Year 2010*, Association of the United States Army Office, 2009, p. 34.
5. *The Army Budget, Fiscal Year 2010*, Association of the United States Army Office, 2009, pp. 25, 33.
6. Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr., and Thomas-Durell Young, *U.S. Department of Defense Strategic Planning: The Missing Nexus*, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1995, pp. 10-15.
7. *Ibid.*, pp. 35-36; and endnote 43, referencing U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, *Defense Organization and the Need for Change*, pp. 495-496.
8. Meinhart, 2003, pp. 14-16.
9. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Memorandum of Policy No.7 (CJCS MOP 7), Joint Strategic Planning System*, Washington DC, 1990, p. 20. Information in this paragraph is from this memorandum.
10. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *CJCS Memorandum of Policy No. 7 (CJCS MOP 7), Joint Strategic Planning System*, Washington DC, 1st Revision, March 17, 1993, pp. 1-2; and Meinhart, 2003, pp. 16-17.
11. *Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3100.01 (CJCSI 3100.01), Joint Strategic Planning System*, Washington DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, September 1, 1997. Note: Chairman's instructions replaced memorandum of policies during this time period.
12. *Ibid.*
13. *Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3010.02A, Joint Vision Implementation Master Plan*, Washington DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 29, 2000.
14. "Joint Strategic Planning System," briefing slides for Joint Processes and Landpower Course 3, Lesson AY 05, Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, October 28, 2004, slide 5.
15. The Joint Staff J-7 was the Office of Primary Responsibility (OPR) for 2003 *Joint Operations Concepts*, but its front cover had the Secretary of Defense seal and the Secretary of Defense signed the Foreword. The 2005 *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations* also had the J-7 as OPR and Secretary of Defense seal on the front cover, but the CJCS now signed the Foreword.
16. Chairman Joint Chiefs of Instruction 3100.01B, *Joint Strategic Planning System* [Working Draft v26 Oct 07].
17. *Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction, (CJCSI) 3100.01B, Joint Strategic Planning System*, Washington DC: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, December 12, 2008. All of the materiel in the next few paragraphs that describe the current system comes from this document.

18. *Ibid.*, p. A 3-4. This figure “depicts critical relationships between formal CJCS activities along with the statutory role they fulfill within the larger National and Department level processes . . . [it] does not depict all interactions and process within the JSPS nor is it meant to imply a firm sequence of actions.”

19. Title 10 U.S. Code Chapter 5 Section 153 (b), available from [www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/](http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/).

20. *CJCSI 3100.01B*, Enclosures B and C.

21. *Ibid.*, Enclosure D.

22. *Ibid.*, p. D-3.

23. Meinhart, 2003, pp. 20-21.

24. *CJCS MOP 7*, pp. 30-39.

25. Harry E. Rothman, *Forging a New National Military Strategy in a Post Cold War World: A Perspective from The Joint Staff*, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1992, p. 4.

26. Colin L Powell, *National Military Strategy of The United States*, Washington DC: January 1992, Discussion that follows on this strategy taken from this source.

27. George H. W. Bush, September 11, 1990, available from [www.millercenter.virginia.edu/scripps/digitalarchive/speeches/spe\\_1990\\_0911\\_bush](http://www.millercenter.virginia.edu/scripps/digitalarchive/speeches/spe_1990_0911_bush).

28. Powell, p. 1.

29. *Ibid.*, p. 19. Data comes from comparing the FY 91 and Base Force differences from the Force Composition table in the National Military Strategy.

30. Rothman, p. 1.

31. Lorna S. Jaffe, *The Development of the Base Force 1989-1992*, Washington, DC: Joint History Office, 1993, p. 50.

32. John M. Shalikashvili, *National Military Strategy of The United States*, Washington, DC, 1995. Discussion that follows on the 1995 strategy taken from this source.

33. Les Aspin, *Report on the BOTTOM-UP REVIEW*, October 1993, available from [www.fas.org/man/docs/bur/part04.htm](http://www.fas.org/man/docs/bur/part04.htm). Comparison in force structure between the 1992 Strategy and the force defined in the Bottom-Up Review.

34. Richard M. Meinhart, *Strategic Planning Through an Organizational Lens*, ProQuest UMI Dissertation Services, 2004, pp. 104-107. Chairman Shalikashvili mentioned readiness an average of 28 times versus Powell’s average of 3.

35. Author’s assessment from comparing the six sections in MOP 7 1993 with sections in the 1995 NMS.

36. Meinhart, 2003, pp. 39-41.

37. John M. Shalikashvili, *National Military Strategy of The United States*, Washington, DC, 1997. Discussion that follows in this and later paragraphs taken from this source.

38. *Ibid.*, p. 11.

39. *Ibid.*, p. 5.

40. Meinhart, 2003, pp 24-26.

41. Richard B. Myers, *National Military Strategy of the United States of America*, Washington, DC, 2004. Discussion that follows on the military strategy taken from this source.

42. *Ibid.*, p. 8.

43. *Ibid.*, p. 21; and Donald H. Rumsfeld, *The National Defense Strategy of The United States of America*, Washington DC, 2005, pp. 16-17.

44. House Report 108-354, "National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004, Section 905 Biennial Review of the National Military Strategy by Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff," available from [thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin](http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin).

45. Douglas Feith and Bill Sullivan, News Transcript "Special Defense Department Briefing," March 18, 2005, available from [www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2005/tr20050318-2282.html](http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2005/tr20050318-2282.html).

46. *Ibid.*