not have time to get beyond relating his ideas to supposedly more relevant factors such as centers of gravity, the superiority of the defense or the culminating point of the offensive. At the same time, few contributors are able to refer to any substantial study of Clausewitz in civilian universities – for obvious reasons. We learn even the study of military history was actively discouraged in Austrian and Japanese universities after 1945.

Several papers attempt to find Clausewitz relevant (or not relevant) to their nation’s experience of conflict – whether national liberation, guerrilla war, Cold War, or post-Cold War conflicts. In most cases the argument is tenuous. Some contributors acknowledge how difficult it is to explain how such influence might occur, or to produce evidence of Clausewitz’s impact on policy or the conduct of war. The problem of influence is all the greater when there is misunderstanding of Clausewitzian thinking or a selective quotation is used to provide spurious authority for an argument. In public debates it is common for “Clausewitzian” to become either a term of approbation or of abhorrence.

One paper stands out from the rest, by Christopher Bassford on “Clausewitz in America today.” True, he has the advantage of reporting on a country that has a strong and extensive intellectual engagement with Clausewitz, at least since the US defeat in Vietnam and the appearance of the Howard-Paret translation of On War in 1976. But he is acutely aware of the methodological problems in demonstrating Clausewitz’s influence (hence the sub-title of his 1994 book, Clausewitz in English, refers to “reception” rather than “influence”), while he is entertainingly trenchant in his analysis of US writers on Clausewitz and forthright in his conclusion – “American military and governmental students get very little out of reading Clausewitz” (349). The volume is worth taking off the library shelf for this contribution alone.

**Creative Strategy: A Guide for Innovation**

By William Duggan

Reviewed by Charles D. Allen, Colonel, USA Retired, Professor, Leadership and Cultural Studies, US Army War College

Within the past decade, the Department of Defense (DOD) and its armed services have issued a call for agile leaders and adaptive organizations while stressing the need for creativity and innovation to sustain US strategic advantages. Many national security professionals will agree with the needs but our military seems continually challenged by creating an effective “how to” that can provide national security advantages. Dr. William Duggan in his latest work, *Creative Strategy: A Guide for Innovation*, provides insights and a framework that may be useful within DOD. He examines two traditional methods claiming to yield creative ideas for strategy: methods of creativity (developing ideas) and methods of strategy (analyze strategic situations).

Dr. Duggan is the author of three previous books on the topic of strategic intuition, which describe the process of organizational innovation: *Napoleon’s Glance: The Secret of Strategy* (2002); *The Art of What Works*: 


165 pages

$27.95
How Success Really Happens (2003); and Strategic Intuition: The Creative Spark in Human Achievement (2007), which the journal Strategy+Business named “Best Strategy Book of the Year.”

While he is a senior lecturer at Columbia Business School (Columbia University is the source of his BA, MA, and PhD), Dr. Duggan is no stranger to the US military. He is a recurring guest lecturer at the Creative and Strategic Leadership electives at the US Army War College, has written a Strategic Studies Institute monograph, Coup d’Oeil: Strategic Intuition in Army Planning, and worked with Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences. Much of what Duggan writes is a direct application of the theory and approach he espouses. He does a deep dive to find historical cases, extracts examples of solutions to pieces of the problem, and then combines them in flashes of insight as innovations addressing the initial or emergent concern.

Accordingly, Duggan takes an individual level phenomenon of what some call creative genius and develops the construct of strategic intuition. For the individual using strategic intuition, “the brain selects a set of elements from memory, combines them in a new way, and projects that new combination into the future as a course of action to follow.” Duggan then provides an organizational-level technique to solve strategic issues. Importantly, an organization’s leaders struggle with strategic questions such as determining “what course of action your company should pursue in the future . . . , where no one person has enough direct experience to give a good answer solely from that source.” Rather than rely on the lone creative individual to divine the great idea, Duggan employs techniques from big corporations such as General Electric to engage multiple elements of the organization to attack its strategic issues.

Extending his assessment of how individuals think and innovate, Duggan presents a framework for creative strategy “where you apply strategic intuition in a systemic way to find a creative solution to a strategic problem.” That framework consists of three phases: rapid appraisal, “what-works scan,” and a creative combination that requires analysis of the problem space and environment, searches for existing solutions from similar problems, and cobbles together elements for an effective and novel resolution.

Readers may claim that this is nothing really new in the area of strategy development. Duggan might agree saying “Ah. Yes, but...” In the second part of the book, he provides a short précis of existing techniques for creativity and innovation and strategy—with a list of the usual suspects. As a counter to readers’ concerns, he offers an assessment of existing “best practices” to identify shortfalls. While he may seem overly dismissive of widely accepted theories and models that have become sacred cows, Duggan asks readers to understand the organizational context and apply elements of “best practices” as appropriate to the strategic problem at hand.

As the subtitle reads, “A Guide for Innovation,” this book is an easy read and very formulaic in demonstrating how to use Duggan’s creative strategy framework. His use of real-world business examples illustrates the application of the framework under conditions of success and failure. Readers may be understandably put off by his claim all other approaches are deficient. Such is the nature of this type of book.
Military readers may draw parallels to the recent design methodology from Army and Joint doctrine as applied to operational art—frame the environment, redefine the problem, and develop operational approaches to resolve the problem. Military readers may also tend to dismiss this book as a business-centered approach and not appropriate for issues of national defense. For this reviewer, creative strategy is bigger than design and it can be applied to organizational and institutional issues. As DOD wrestles with new policy and strategic guidance, downsizing and restructuring the force, and the need to develop effective structures to provide national security, I can see no greater opportunity to give this Duggan’s framework a chance.